Marx, Weber, and Pareto on the Changing Status of Women
Helen M. Hacker Originally published 1953
General theories of social change may be valuable in providing basic orientations in a dynamic world, but of equal interest to the social scientist are the specific hypotheses which may be derived from these theories and subjected to empirical verification. Such derived hypotheses, of course, deal with smaller segments of the social universe. In the present case recent changes in the role and status of women have been taken as the social event which may be explained in terms of a general theory of social change. In pursuit of this purpose we turn to three architectonic masters of the past: Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Vilfredo Pareto. The attempt here is not so much to find explicit references to women in the writings of these theorists, but to make applications from their general schemes to the special problem of women in modern society.
Karl Marx
The name of Karl Marx has become identified with the economic interpretation of history, a view which holds that economic institutions are inherently more dynamic than other institutions, and, although there is mutual interaction among all the institutions of a culture, economic changes are usually prior and most fundamental. The relevance of Marx to changes in the role and status of women will be considered under four heads: (1) the material changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution; (2) the ideological changes consequent upon the Industrial Revolution; (3) the social basis of leadership in the woman’s movement; and (4) socialist views on the “woman question.”
Too familiar for extended comment are the economic changes brought about by the industrial, commercial, and agrarian revolutions. The accumulating stream of inventions over the period from the Protestant Reformation to the Victorian Age broke the bonds of feudalism and undermined the domestic system. The skills of handicraftsmen in the towns became obsolete with the increasing use of machinery, and the pull of the factories combined with the push of enclosures to attract the yeomen and peasants from the countryside to the industrial towns.
Production became more and more roundabout with an increasing number of processes between raw materials and finished products. Capital requirements and the necessary centralization of steam power prevented workers from acquiring and using the new machines in their own homes, and they were too lacking in social skills to form producing cooperatives.
Not only were the methods of production transformed, but the new methods of production gave rise to new relations of production. The family no longer worked as a productive unit, but offered themselves as individuals upon the labor market. Division of labor in the factory replaced the cooperative work in the home. The abysmally low wages of the early days of industrial capitalism often made it necessary for wife and children to supplement the man’s earnings.
Thus, the center of activities was shifted from the home to the factory. Here the worker was viewed as a commodity, to use Marx’s word, a factor of production, and his other roles as father, husband, community member, son of God, were of minor concern. Ties of sentiment and tradition were set aside, and the patriarchal family, which had been a microcosm of the feudalistic structure, crumbled under the atomizing forces of capitalism.
With the husband and father no longer the economic director of the household economy, familism was discouraged and individualism fostered. Thus the stage was set for women to emerge from the shadows of the home into the glare of the workaday world. Working-class women trudged to work with their husbands and shared the factory discipline. Middle-class women enjoyed new comforts and leisure in the home or sought more active participation in the community and the business and professional world.
Concomitant with changes in the mode of production came a new social climate in which the strong winds of rationality, democracy, and nationalism blew coldly on the familial hearth. Workers habituated to the machine carried a practical, matter-of-fact attitude over into other areas of life, nor was the family of the rationalizing entrepreneur immune to the growing influence of secularism, skepticism, science. Timeworn institutions and ideas were subjected to scrutiny, including old notions regarding the proper province of women.
The French Revolution ushered in the ideology of the rights of man. The rights of citizenship lost their dependence upon property ownership and family identification. Men voted as individual citizens, not as family representatives. The decreasing emphasis on family implied a new basis for the social role of women.
Nationalism reinforced democracy in playing down the family. The first allegiance was to the nation-state rather than to the family or local community, and country was served by individuals. In time of war women left small children to their own devices to answer the patriotic call to replace the absent men in the factories.
Women’s new participation in industry had its psychological effects. Their role as worker influenced their family and general social roles, and these roles often came into conflict. Traditional femininity, as expressed in dress, differential behavior, coquettishness, emotionality, etc., could not survive the impersonal demands of the job. Secondly, as is true of rising classes, economic independence brought the desire for legal, social, and political rights.
The Industrial Revolution, by creating a new class of leisured and educated women, provided a source of leadership, as well as the materialistic base, for the woman’s movement. Marx and Engels cried their jeremiads on the plight of women under capitalism.1 They believed that in bourgeois marriage women were regarded essentially as instruments of production, their product being legitimate heirs. Modern adultery was in part an expression of women’s rebellion against the exclusive supremacy of men in a patriarchal society, and in part an expression of the bourgeois desire for a community of women, a system of wives in common.2
Marx and Engels saw modern marriage and modern prostitution as merely two sides of the same coin—one being public and the other private prostitution. Public prostitution, as old as monogamy, was reinforced by the economic power of the bourgeoisie, indirectly, by foisting degrading conditions of life upon proletarian women, and directly, by seducing them. “Factory servitude, like any other,” says Engels, “confers the jus primae noctis upon the master.”3 A hint or threat from the employer is supposedly sufficient to put the worker’s wife or daughter at his disposal. Moreover, proclaims The Manifesto, “Our bourgeois, not content with having the wives and daughters of their proletarians at their disposal, not to speak of common prostitutes, take the greatest pleasure in seducing each other’s wives.”4
From this view of women under capitalism as exploited in the factory, in the home, and on the street, it would seem that Marx did not believe that his analysis of the transition from feudalism to capitalism implied any favorable changes in the position of women—or only as preparing the material conditions for the consummation of socialism in which the status of women as mere instruments of production would be done away with. (The status of women under socialism is beyond the confines of this paper.) But for that matter neither did Marx lay heavy emphasis on the change from status to contract for men; he concentrated on the evils, shams, and hypocrisies of capitalism.
We can, however, supplement his analysis by pointing out the contradictory effects of capitalism. Certainly monogamy based on private property and prostitution based on the subordination of women are not unique to capitalism, although capitalism may have perpetuated and reinforced them. It is also true that while capitalism provided the material basis for the emancipation of women, the relations of production which it established added new pressures to their traditional servitude and prevented them from realizing the social potentialities inherent in the changed methods of production. Marx delighted in pointing out the contradictions of capitalism, and here is another for him.
Max Weber
To a considerable extent, Weber’s analysis of bureaucracy may be viewed as a refinement of Marx’s account of capitalism.5 Bureaucracy is made necessary, says Weber, by the interdependence of a complex, ever more inclusive society based on the division of labor, and is implicit in any large-scale organization, whether it be cartel or trade union, capitalistic or socialistic. The continuing momentum of the Industrial Revolution has brought such specialization of function that only God can be a jack of all trades.
A key concept in Weber’s study of bureaucracy is the notion of “office.” (Modern sociology prefers the term “status,” which means a collection of rights and duties.) An office is a position in a bureaucratically governed structure which entails the discharge of specific duties and the receipt of certain emoluments. Each office has its own jurisdictional area defined in such a way as to make it fit with a minimum of overlapping or hiatuses into a firmly ordered system of super- and subordination, in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones. Office-holding is a vocation (Beruf), requiring a prescribed course of training. Entrance into an office is usually impossible without passing the prescribed and special examinations which are presumed to establish a person’s qualifications for fulfilling the duties of an office and executing its corresponding rights.
In essence, bureaucracy represents the attempt to achieve a government of law, and not of men. For the personal fealty of feudalism it substitutes loyalty to one’s office. Presented in the following discussion are only a few salient features of Weber’s detailed analysis of bureaucratic organization, but sufficient, perhaps, to indicate several implications for the changing role and status of women.
In the first place, bureaucracy, by abjuring individual privilege and bestowals of favor, strikes at the emotional, personal, and irrational elements in life, and tends to undermine special treatment of groups or individuals. Women, as well as men, are subject to the same impersonal rules. Since special pleading has been traditionally thought to be woman’s forte, bureaucracy has the effect of modifying the ascribed status of women and altering the female stereotype. Also, with the increasing bureaucratization of society, women must satisfy their needs as individuals rather than as family members. They must stand in line with men to apply for unemployment insurance, old age benefits, dog licenses, mortgage loans, employment interviews, college registrations, etc.
Secondly, bureaucratization fosters specialization as offices multiply. Ever increasing areas of life are professionalized and the amateur is discarded. Women, as the main amateur group in society, are more and more deprived of employment, and forced to train themselves for specialized positions which are increasingly available to them.
In general, bureaucratization parallels democratization, although the two may come into conflict. Thus, in bureaucratic control there is a tendency to levelling in the interest of the broadest possible basis of recruitment in terms of technical competence. This tendency would lead to the undermining of all minority groups, including women, whose ascribed status served to remove them from the sphere of effective competition.6 On the other hand, there is a tendency to plutocracy growing out of the interest in the greatest possible length of technical training. Today such training often lasts up to the age of thirty. Previously submerged strata, such as women, may have special obstacles to overcome in qualifying as experts.
While bureaucratization extends the range of selection at the foot of the vocational ladder, it renders mobility at higher rungs more difficult. Ancillary attributes come to be attached to the various offices (or achieved statuses) which those aspirants who have not come up by regular channels are thought to lack. Thus, bureaucracy affords more freedom to those beginning their careers, but tends to freeze persons at upper levels.
This reinforcement of status is particularly true for women, because fewer offices are open to them, and consequently, their mobility is less than men’s. For example, a woman might work up to be head of the Federal Security Agency but she would have less possibility than a man of transferring to the top position in the Department of Commerce. In the case of women, even more than men, special knowledge and long service are emphasized more than general capacity.
The reader may wonder at the omission of any consideration of bureaucratization as a final stage in social movements. The course of bureaucratic development is frequently such that the separation of the organization from the needs of its clientele grows. The organization becomes devoted to procedure and manifests lack of adaptability to changing conditions, its sole interest being self-perpetuation. Although such developments may be characteristic of contemporary women’s organizations, this phenomenon is not vitally related to the major theme of the changing status of women.
Weber has contributed to our understanding of the changing role and status of women not only through his analysis of bureaucracy, but also through his ideological interpretation of social change, as expressed in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. But the lessons here to be derived have already been gleaned from Marx, whom Weber does not contradict, but supplements. It makes no difference whether capitalism came into existence as a result of a new psychological attitude derived from the religious revolution of the sixteenth century or whether capitalism developed its own religious system and ethics. There is no a priori reason for supposing that the economic structure is more inherently dynamic than any other, or that the religious system is.
The analysis must be made for each particular case, and even in the limited case of capitalism the evidence is not univocal. Modern social science favors the functional approach, discussed below, which views society as being in moving equilibrium and, in carrying on investigations of reciprocal changes in a social system, recognizes that the selection of a starting point is merely a matter of convenience. Weber himself admits as much when he says that he does not seek to establish priority but only concomitance of the capitalistic spirit with the incidence of capitalism. Other evidence, however, suggests that this disclaimer is a purely formal one. In any case, whether economic organization or ideology is the prime mover, ideological influences have been stated already under Marx.
Vilfredo Pareto
In his Trattato di Sociologia Generale (1916), Pareto sets forth a theory of social equilibrium which depends upon the distribution of “residues” among the social classes.7 Residues, according to Pareto, are the driving forces of human action, the “non-logical manifestations of sentiments,” or “instincts.” They correspond roughly to what contemporary psychologists call complexes.
He groups the residues under six general classes, but only the first two classes, the residues of combinations and the residues of persistence of aggregates, are most important for his theory of social change. By residues of combination he means inventive faculty, ingeniousness, originality, imagination, or the ability to synthesize. On the whole, this class of residues represents the progressive elements in society as contrasted with Class II, the “myth-making instinct” or the “instinct of group persistency,” which is the conservative force. Residues of persistence of aggregates, Class II, signify a drive to continue the type of culture and social relations established as a result of Class I residues.
The residues are non-logical, but men wish to “rationalize” their actions, and the devices they use to cloak their acts with a show of reason Pareto calls “derivations.” These are grouped under four broad classes: (1) assertions; (2) authority; (3) accord with sentiments or with principles; and (4) verbal proofs. Although there is interaction among residues and derivations, the influence of residues upon derivations is much more powerful. In fact, the residues may be considered almost as constants in human action, while the derivations which express the residues change with the times.
In the interest of brevity it is necessary to omit his division of society into the two economic classes of speculators and rentiers, who are characterized respectively by the predominance of Class I and Class II residues. Turning to the distribution of political power, he holds that all societies are divided into a higher and a lower stratum, the elite and the non-elite, the rulers and the ruled. The upper stratum is normally rich in the residues of combination and the lower in those of persistence of aggregates. The elite may have come to power as “lions,” that is, by using force, but they find that “ruse” is more effective in maintaining power, and hence the elite becomes increasingly dominated by “foxes” or men skilled in the use of ruse.
Circulation of the elite is constantly changing the governing elite, as recruits are admitted from below. This slow transformation of the elite is necessary to maintain it in power because it declines in vigor through the loss of the proper residues. Revolutions are precipitated when the circulation of the elite fails, causing an accumulation of superior elements in the subject class and a glut of inferior elements in the ruling class. This is likely to happen when the elite abandons force and resorts to fraud, loses its superior residues, and thus exposes its weakness to the power-hungry speculators and lions below. These latter do not hesitate to use their own force against the aristocracy and set up a new elite. When this happens, the equilibrium is once again restored and the cycle of transformation begins anew.
If space may be taken for a word of criticism, in some respects Pareto provides a “natural history” of revolution, but the theory of instincts upon which he has founded his system is subjective. His residues are constructs, corresponding to no objective reality. Pareto says that whatever hinders the free circulation of people endowed with the instincts fitting men to rule tends to cause an upheaval. One must inquire into the origin of these “instincts.”
In applying Pareto’s theories to the changing role and status of women, let us consider first his notion of the circulation of the elite. It is improbable that the idea of women as a submerged stratum ever entered Pareto’s mind. Whether their husbands, sons, and lovers were lions or foxes, women have by and large played the part of the fox, if not the serpent. As one of the Church Fathers put it: “Fierce is the dragon, cunning the asp; but woman has the malice of both” (St. Gregory of Nazianzum).
There are, however, two writers, Mathias and Mathilde Vaerting, who have viewed the division between the sexes as a class cleavage.8 Their speculations are guided by the Marxist conception of history as the history of class struggles, and they perceive women as an oppressed class in our society. Like Marx, they regard ideologies as the rationalizations of power relationships. In their interpretation of ancient history, they too must struggle against the subtle falsifications of historians with the “master-class bias,” men whose rearing in patriarchal traditions has rendered them incapable of understanding the fundamentally different organizations and ideologies of matriarchal societies.
The Vaertings believe they have found sufficient documentary evidence for the statement that in a society in which women rule there is a complete reversal of the relative positions of the sexes, accompanied by a complete reversal of social attitudes, or, to use Pareto’s terminology, a different distribution of the residues. For the criteria of domination of one sex they use the legal position (including property rights), the division of labor, and ideologies (including moral codes, religion, sex ethics, ideals of beauty, etc.) and establish ancient Egypt, Libya, and Sparta as Women’s States.
They believe that so-called “masculine” and “feminine” traits are psychological manifestations of an either dominant or subordinate social position. (The psychologist A. H. Maslow also favors substituting the concepts of high and low dominance for masculine and feminine, though he does not make the dubious assumption that such personality traits are exclusively related to social position.)9 The Vaertings assume a pendulum movement between female and male domination. In their view evolution went from an original state in which women ruled to a state of masculine domination, passing through a transitory phase of sex equality (in which, for instance, the Teutons were found at the time of Tacitus). The Vaertings see, today, the pendulum swinging back and, at the present stage, approaching again an intermediate state of equality.
They think that the change was a necessary consequence of the abuses to which any hegemony ultimately leads owing to its inner laws—just as Marx thought the inner contradictions of capitalism would lead to its collapse. The Vaertings, however, do not postulate a “dictatorship of women” as a preliminary stage to the ideal “classless” society. Parallels with Pareto may also be found. To the extent that able women are drawn into the governing male elite, causing its gradual transformation, revolution will be averted. The position of the Vaertings is obviously open to criticism, but it serves to show a possible application of Pareto’s doctrine of the circulation of the elite.
We pass now to a brief mention of the role of the residues and derivations. These concepts represent Pareto’s contribution to a theory of ideology. His dichotomy between the derivations and the residues parallels that of Marx between ideological superstructure and relations of production, of Freud between rationalizations and unconscious motivations, of the functionalist school between manifest function and latent function, of the sociologist between formal structure and informal structure, of the semanticists between emotive and referential, of Karl Mannheim between ideologies-and-utopias and existential situations, etc.
Pareto posits the tendency to shift from one derivation to another according to convenience, but all derivations support relatively unchanging residues or valuations. (That this idea is itself a derivation, and hence non-logical, seemingly does not occur to Pareto.) But let us look at the changing derivations with regard to women. The residue in this case is that women by nature are fitted for a different role in society from men.
What have been the derivations rationalizing this residue? It was once thought that women were more variable than men. Havelock Ellis initiated the view that there is a greater “organic variational tendency” in men, so that while there are more geniuses to be found among men, there are also more idiots and criminals among them.10 Although Ellis regarded the difference in variability between men and women as organic, it is not unlikely that his views reflect the increased social participation of women in positions previously closed to them. Incidentally, this “variational tendency” has been seriously challenged by Karl Pearson, L. S. Hollingworth, and others.11 If true, it is certainly susceptible of a sociological explanation. Most psychologists today believe that sex differences in intelligence are negligible.
The next shift in derivations is that while men and women were similar in intellectual capacity, they differed in specific abilities. Thus, males excelled in numerical and spatial relations, while feminine prestige rested on verbal accomplishment and artistic sensitivity. That such differences are biological in origin is contested, in at least one instance, by G. M. Gilbert’s study of musical ability in which it was found that sex differences disappeared when musical training was held constant.12
A final derivation to be noted is that provided by psychoanalysis. Faced with the indubitable fact that women were successfully performing an ever increasing number of civic, business, industrial, and professional roles, such epigoni of Freud as Dr. Marynia Farnham, Ferdinand Lundberg, Dr. Banay, and Helena Deutsch have averred that modern women are dismally unhappy, and that their unhappiness stems from a conflict of their biological natures with their new social roles, which they link to their biological roles.13 The truly feminine woman in their view does not presume to understand the “man’s world,” much less compete in it.
Thus we see that the argument has shifted from pseudo-scientific to pseudo-moralistic grounds, but no matter what the level of sophistication of the derivations, the residue remains that woman’s place is uniquely in the home carrying on breeding and tending functions. One cannot hazard a guess as to the future constancy of this residue.
Contemporary Sociology
The reader who has followed this speculative account of how Marx, Weber, and Pareto might explain the changes in the role and status of modern women may well wonder to what extent their theories have been influential in bringing about such changes. This question itself invokes a theory of social change, especially in regard to the relative influences of material and ideological factors in human history, as discussed above. Before taking up this more general aspect of the question, we can find a preliminary answer in pointing to the limitations of the theories under consideration.
First of all, it should be remembered that these theorists did not speak directly about women. They provided general theories of social change, which have here been applied to the special case of changes in the status of women. Marx, of course, made many explicit references to women, but the present extrapolation draws not so much on these references as on the implications of his general analysis of the genesis and development of industrial capitalism. To consider, therefore, how far changes in the status of women may be attributed to the theories of these three thinkers is an enterprise second removed from the data. No doubt they helped to establish a new climate of opinion in which many problems were exposed, including that of women.
Secondly, Weber and Pareto, if not Marx, were primarily concerned with describing and explaining social change rather than effecting it. No one pretended to a greater detachment from the follies of men than Pareto, and Weber was convinced that sociological research must be “value-free.” Marx, it is true, expressed himself as wishing more to change the world than to understand it, and indeed his theories became the basis of a social movement which, whatever its contemporary manifestations, has actively campaigned, especially in Europe, for a new social role for women.
In the third place, it is difficult to assess the popular influence of such recondite theories. Weber and Pareto addressed themselves to a limited group of scholars, and their ideas did not lend themselves to extensive popularization. The case would be quite different for a philosopher like John Dewey, whose disciples were numerous, and vigorous in teaching the next generation. The final answer to the question will have to wait upon extensive empirical research in which sociology and social psychology must supplement history. Whatever their effect may be found to be, it is improbable that these theories were responsible in any but the most minor way for recent changes in women’s rights and duties. One would look rather to feminine leadership, encroaching upon the special privileges of men, and the massive social change initiated by the Industrial Revolution.
In conducting research on the social effects of these theories of social change one might suppose that the theories themselves would provide working hypotheses. Undoubtedly they will be suggestive, but modern social scientists are turning away from master conceptual schemes, which run far ahead of present capacities for verification of derived specific theories, in favor of what Robert K. Merton has called “theories of the middle range”—special theories applicable to limited ranges of data rather than one grand architectonic structure.14
Such scientists, who deem Marx too particularistic and Pareto too abstract and tautological, find in the structural-functional approach to the understanding of social change a framework for investigating changes in the microcosmic structures within a society.15 In this conception a society is viewed as interdependent institutions in a moving equilibrium in which changes occurring in one institution tend to produce changes in related institutions—that “strain toward consistency” noted by Sumner. Too great conflicts among institutions are precluded by the need of the individual to integrate his roles and achieve a unified life outlook.
What constitutes a conflict, of course, may represent in part a social valuation, except in the obvious physical case where a person cannot be in two places or perform contradictory acts at the same time. To illustrate the latter, the same person cannot participate in a religious institution which requires a week of solitary retreat every year and a family institution which requires that a husband may never leave his wife overnight. But whether there is a conflict between being a good husband and beating one’s wife is a matter of social definition. It remains true, however, that the establishment of certain patterns in one institution or of a given set of social values rules out certain possibilities in related institutions or value systems. Slavery would be impossible in a region of minimal food supply. Nor can we expect a society which cleaves to the primacy of the goal of economic productivity to call a moratorium upon invention.
A perfect correlation among the various institutions of a culture must not be assumed. It is doubtful whether all societies, even preliterate ones, have as integrated cultures as Dr. Benedict expounded in her configurational approach to the Zuni, Dobuans, and Kwakiutl, but the organic analogy, if not pressed too far, does have some validity.16 Although we may not find with Spengler “deep uniformities between the differential calculus and the dynastic principle of politics in the age of Louis XIV, between the Classical city-state and the Euclidean geometry, between the space perspective of Western oil painting and the conquest of space by railroad, telephone and long-range weapon, between contrapuntal music and credit economics,” still there tend to be patterns, if not souls, of culture.17
What this means for the changing role and status of women is that given our business civilization, our ideology of democracy and individualism, our secular rationalism, it is unlikely that women will resume their traditional role unless this syndrome is altered. (Democracy and science were crushed under the heel of fascism, but even Nazi Germany found it necessary to call women from the three “Ks” to reenter the factories.) Similarly, women’s increasing participation in vocational and civic groups reinforces industrialism, democracy, etc.
One must guard, of course, against the fallacy of assuming that historically isolated connections are necessary connections. While the patriarchal family was associated with the agrarian and hand-tool way of life, it may be compatible with other economic institutions, and, conversely, the equalitarian family may be a possibility in a predominantly agricultural society. There are so many variables to be considered! The web of inter-relationships in our present society, however, would seem to be such as to make the restoration of the eighteenth-century woman impossible unless we scrap the machines and burn the books.
Admittedly conflicts abound in our culture, and prominent among them are disharmonies in women’s roles and statuses.18 These, like other conflicts, often arise from disparities in the rates of change of various institutions. Such rapid changes may have unanticipated consequences for which adjustment is sought.
The ideology of the pre-urban, pre-industrial era which ascribed certain roles to women in our society has come into conflict with the individualistic ideology engendered by the machine age. This conflict finds concrete expression in the difficulties experienced by modern women in their efforts to unify the roles which they play in the contemporary world. Specifically, the problem confronting women is how to reorganize marriage and family institutions to fit changing economic and political institutions. It is not beyond hope that a democratic resolution may be found for the contradictions present today in the role and status of American women.
Notes
1 See Marx, Karl. 1906. Capital. Trans. by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling. Chicago, IL: Charles H. Kerr & Co., esp. pp. 431-40, 506-8, 536, and references noted below.
2 Engels, Frederick. 1902. The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State. Trans. by Ernest Untermann. Chicago, IL: Charles H. Kerr & Co., pp. 81-2. Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1888. The Communist Manifesto. Trans. by Samuel Moore. Chicago, IL: Charles H. Kerr & Co., pp. 38-9.
3 Engels, Frederick. 1892. The Condition of the Working-Class in England in 1844. Trans. by Florence Kelley Wischnewetzky. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., pp. 149, 181.
4 The Communist Manifesto, op. cit., p. 39.
5 Weber, Max. 1922. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Tuebingen, J. C. B. Mohr, pp. 650-78. See also Gerth H. H., and C. Wright Mills. 1946. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 196-244.
6 Hacker, Helen Mayer. 1951. “Women as a Minority Group.” Social Forces 30(October): 60-69.
7 Pareto, Vilfredo. 1935. The Mind and Society. Trans. by Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston, 4 vols. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.
8 Vaerting, Mathilde and Mathias Vaerting. 1923. The Dominant Sex: A Study in the Sociology of Sex Differentiation. Trans. by Eden and Cedar Paul. New York: George H. Doran Co.
9 Maslow, A. H. 1939. “Dominance, Personality, and Social Behavior in Women.” Journal of Social Psychology 10: 3-39, particularly p. 18.
10 Ellis, Havelock. 1934. Man and Woman: A Study of Secondary and Tertiary Sexual Characters (1894), 8th rev. ed. London: Heinemann. p. 439. Other writers have followed Ellis’s lead. See, for example, Carpenter, Edward. 1911. Love’s Coming of Age. New York: Modern Library, pp. 45 and 187; and Thorndike, E. L. 1910. Educational Psychology. p. 35.
11 Pearson, Karl. 1987. “Variation in Man and Woman,” Pp. 256 in The Chances of Death and Other Studies in Evolution, Vol. I. London: Cambridge University Press. Hollingworth, Leta and Helen Montague. 1914. “The Comparative Variability of the Sexes at Birth.” American Journal of Sociology. 20(November): 335-70. Hollingworth, Leta S. 1922. “Differential Action Upon the Sexes of Forces Which Tend to Segregate the Feebleminded.” Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology 17(April-June): 35-57. Hollingworth, Leta Stetter. 1914. “Variability as Related to Sex Differences in Achievement.” American Journal of Sociology 19(January): 510-30.
12 Gilbert, G. M. 1942. “Sex Differences in Musical Aptitude and Training.” Journal of General Psychology 26(January): 19-33.
13 Lundberg, Ferdinand and Marynia F. Farnham. 1947. Modern Woman: The Lost Sex. New York: Harper and Bros. Deutsch, Helene. 1944-1945. The Psychology of Women, 2 vols. New York: Grune and Stratton.
14 Merton, Robert K. 1949. Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, p. 5.
15 For an indication of some of the theoretical difficulties of the structural-functional approach, the modern refinement of older notions of functionalism, see Hacker, Helen Mayer. 1951. “Arnold Rose’s ‘A Deductive Ideal-Type Method.” American Journal of Sociology 56(January): 354-56.
16 Benedict, Ruth. 1934. Patterns of Culture. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co.
17 Spengler, Oswald. 1926. Decline of the West. Trans. by Charles Francis Atkinson, 2 vols. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, vol. 1, p. 7.
18 See Hacker, Helen Mayer. “Towards a Definition of Role Conflicts in Modern Women.” Unpublished Manuscript.